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Critical Discussion

THE DECLINE OF LITERARY CRITICISM
by Richard A. Posner

R

ónán McDonald, a lecturer in literature at the University of
Reading, has written a short, engaging book the theme of which
is evident from the title: The Death of the Critic. Although there is plenty
of both academic and journalistic writing about literature, less and less
is well described by the term “literary criticism.” The literary critics of
the first two-thirds or so of the twentieth century, now dead, including
poets and other creative writers, such as T. S. Eliot, journalists such as
Edmund Wilson, and academic literary critics, as distinct from literary
scholars, such as F. R. Leavis in England and Cleanth Brooks in the
United States, have so few successors that the very genre, if not yet dead,
is moribund.1 McDonald deplores the decline of literary criticism and
seeks to explain its causes.
In place of literary criticism, McDonald (and many others, such as
John Ellis) argue, we have postmodern literary theory, an animal of
quite a different color from literary criticism.2 “Texts . . . are interpreted
and analysed with a view to unlocking the social norms and attitudes
encoded therein, not assessed or evaluated as integral, self-contained
creations” (McDonald, p. 21). “The ‘best’ [is regarded] as a politically
dubious category, with selections made in its name often nurturing hidden and hierarchical agendas”(p. ix). “In a comparatively short time,
The Death of the Critic, by Rónán McDonald, 160 pp. New York: Continuum,
2007, $23.95.
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academic literary criticism has been transformed. Many [literary critics]
now regard social activism as the major purpose of literary criticism.”
And “people who write about literature now write in a prose thick with
impenetrable jargon,” which erects a barrier between literary theory and
literature.3 The well documented decline in the reading of literature
has many causes but one may be the obscurantist and politicized style
of teaching literature that is in vogue in many colleges.4
But something deeper is involved. After all, most literary teachers are
not postmodernists. What has happened is the professionalization, in not
altogether a good sense, of literary studies. Let me illustrate. More than
half a century ago, Cleanth Brooks published what became a famous
book of literary criticism, consisting of close readings of famous poems.5
The New Critics were much taken with the metaphysical poets, the most
prominent of whom was John Donne, and the high point of Brooks’s
book was his brilliant close reading of “Canonization,” one of Donne’s
most famous love poems. Just this year (2008) a professor of literature
named Ramie Targoff published John Donne, Soul and Body, which has an
extensive treatment of Donne’s love poetry, though it does not mention
“Canonization.” As far as I can judge, Targoff’s book is a fine scholarly
achievement—well written (and not defaced by jargon), thoroughly
researched, thoughtful, imaginative. She argues that contrary to some
scholars who have regarded Donne as a Neoplatonist who therefore
believed that the highest love is purely spiritual (as it was for Plato),
he was, throughout his career—even when he became a fiercely devout
Anglican cleric writing fervid religious verse—a believer that body and
soul were one in all activities, including sexual love; hence the religious
imagery in “Canonization,” emphasized by Cleanth Brooks, who would
I think have found Targoff’s analysis congenial. Her book is I would
guess a model of modern literary scholarship.
But here is the difference between Brooks’s book, and specifically
his discussion of Donne’s poem, and Targoff’s. Brooks, who though
a distinguished Yale English professor did not have a Ph.D., wrote for
a mixed audience—academics, students, the general reader—and he
made the nonacademic members of that audience want to read Donne,
or read more Donne, or re-read Donne with greater understanding and
enjoyment. Targoff writes for other scholars of early modern English
literature. Someone else who chances on the book (like me) may read it
and think well of it, but unless one has esoteric religious or philosophical interests the experience of reading her book will not quicken one’s

Richard A. Posner

387

interest in reading Donne’s poetry—which is a great shame, given the
state of the literary culture in America.
The professionalization of literary studies has many causes, but one
of particular significance is a half century or more falling off in literary
creativity. There are peaks in artistic creativity and troughs. For literature, the first quarter of the twentieth century was an incredible peak,
and it engendered exciting literary criticism. In part this was because
much of this modernist literature was difficult, and required expert
interpretation. But that factor is overemphasized. Most modernist
literature (Eliot, Yeats, late Henry James, Proust, Joyce until Finnegans
Wake) is difficult only in comparison with Tennyson. Much literature
that endures, whatever the era in which it was composed, is downright
baffling—think of Shakespeare and his contemporaries (what did Marvell mean by “Annihilating all that’s made / To a green Thought in a
green Shade”?), or for that matter of Keats—what does “Beauty is truth,
truth beauty” mean?
What happens in a period of heightened literary creativity is that
not only are there exciting new works to subject to literary criticism
but that, as T. S. Eliot famously said, the old works are seen in a new
light—think of how Eliot’s own poetic practices shaped his criticism of
Dante, Donne, the Elizabethan and Jacobean playwrights, and Milton.
We are now rather in a trough of literary creativity, probably because of
the rise of competing media for expression, and so there is less exciting
work for literary critics. Not that there aren’t fine writers; but they are
not literary revolutionaries—the analogy is to Thomas Kuhn’s notion of
“normal science,” the dullish stretches between “paradigm shifts.”
But there is still a need for college and university teachers of English,
and a felt need to evaluate them on the basis of their publications,
and so the focus of their writing shifts from criticism to the more conventional form of academic scholarship that involves writing for each
other. The resulting decline in literary criticism retards the prospects
for a renewal of literary creativity by reducing the audience for serious
literature, so there is unfortunately something of a vicious cycle, though
it seems doubtful that literary criticism has ever been much of a spur
to literary creativity.
Now all that I have said so far is merely prologue; it is the (highly
tentative) answer I would give to McDonald’s question about the causes
of the decline of literary criticism. He not only gives a different answer,
but has a different conception of literary criticism, and let me begin
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my analysis of his book there. For him (not for me, as I’ll explain in
due course) the essence of literary criticism is that it is evaluative; his
book’s “governing theme is the fate of evaluation and the basis on
which it is built” (p. ix). Because criticism is evaluative, it is disliked, as
McDonald illustrates with some wonderful quotations. From Brendan
Behan: “Critics are like eunuchs in a harem; they know how it is done,
they’ve seen it done every day, but they’re unable to do it themselves”
(p. 9). From George Bernard Shaw: “A drama critic is a man who leaves
no turn unstoned” (p. 10). From Samuel Becket: literary criticism is
“hysterectomies with a trowel” (p. 10). Northrop Frye derided evaluative criticism as belonging to the history of taste rather than to literary
criticism (pp. 100–101).
Of course, literary criticism is not all negative; “critic” is etymologically related to “criteria”; the literary critic is a judge, not a denouncer,
and McDonald gives examples of literary criticism that have promoted
a writer’s work, such as Edmund Wilson’s book Axel’s Castle. Nevertheless, literary critics’ “trade is evaluative hierarchies”—but, as we have just
seen, “they are low on the totem pole of the writing profession” (p. 41),
so when they do “criticize,” their work is derided by the writers.
The criticisms of criticism make it fragile, vulnerable, and so does
the difficulty that critics have in keeping their criticism free from contamination by their religious, political, and other extraliterary beliefs.
The New Critics, nominally formalist, emphasized not only their opposition to science, technology, and industry,6 but also their belief that the
outlook they found in the poetry and other literature they admired was
isomorphic with Christianity.7 McDonald argues that postmodern literary
theory descends from F. R. Leavis and other “extrinsic” critics (among
whom the New Critics must, for the reason I just stated, be counted):
“By focusing on the moral, life-affirming qualities of art, [Leavis] had
created a culture whereby artistic values were instrumental, directed at
purposes outside the artwork’s own merits” (p. 121). To the extent that
literary critics’ evaluations of literary works are moral or ideological,
they are unlikely to be objective. And, like the New Critics, Leavis and
his followers saw the “moral, life-affirming qualities of art” as a bulwark
against technological modernity, yet could not resist the pressure that
academia exerts on academics to strive for intellectual rigor: “the implicit
or explicit calls on scientific authority to justify literary critical practices,
while at the same time holding culture as the redemptive alternative to
science, would generate a tension that could easily teeter into outright
contradiction. All that needed to happen was for the value-free methods
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of literary criticism to double back and collide with its quasi-religious
purposes” (p. 93).
Notice the dependence of McDonald’s analysis on his conception of
literary criticism as evaluative. It is because it is evaluative (and because
most of the evaluators are not themselves creative writers) that it is hated
by creative writers and undermined by the critics’ inability to exclude
their political or religious beliefs from their criticism at the same time
that they are pretending to be rigorous and objective.
Suppose evaluation is not the essence of literary criticism. Suppose,
further, that the quest for objective evaluation of literary works is a snipe
hunt, so that it is fortunate that evaluation is not the essence of literary
criticism. This reorientation would make the decline of criticism no less
real, but would upend McDonald’s explanation of it.
Let me return to Cleanth Brooks’s analysis of Donne’s “Canonization.”
It is obvious that he admires the poem. But he does not tell the reader,
this is a good poem—read it; don’t read Joyce Kilmer or Vachel Lindsay. He explains the poem, with particular emphasis on why it is shot
through with paradox. He argues throughout The Well Wrought Urn that
paradox is the language of poetry, and he supports the argument with
reference not only to the “Canonization” but also to poems by Milton,
Pope, Wordsworth, and others who were not part of the metaphysical
school, the school of Donne. He leaves it to the reader to decide whether
to read any of these poems. If one thinks of how the great twentiethcentury critics influenced taste—such as T. S. Eliot with respect to the
metaphysical poets, Edmund Wilson with respect to the modernist poets,
F. R. Leavis with resepct to D. H. Lawrence—one quickly realizes that it
was not by ex cathedra utterance, such as “I am T. S. Eliot, the great poet
and intellectual, and I tell you that Donne is superior to Milton,” but by
saying, in effect, “You should try reading Donne, because he does things
that when you understand him may cause you as it has caused me to
prefer him to Milton, and he has a more mature, a more comprehensive
conception of the human condition than Shelley (though less so than
Dante did), as well as more exact metaphors.”
The approach of the influential academic critics, such as Brooks
and Empson, C. S. Lewis and Lionel Trilling, A. C. Bradley and Richard Blackmun, was essentially the same. They were writing not only or
even primarily for other academics, but rather for serious students and
the cream of the general reading public, and they were trying to make
literature more accessible and more interesting to readers.
Thus, what has been lost is literary criticism that helps people
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 nderstand and enjoy serious literature. The disappearance of arbiters
u
of taste, of literary mandarins whose authority the laity is expected to
acknowledge, is no loss. As Benedetto Croce said, “criticism conceived
as magistrate kills the dead or breathes on the face of what is very much
alive anyway . . . I would like to ask whether critics have been responsible
for establishing the greatness of Dante, Shakespeare, or Michelangelo, or,
on the contrary, the great number of their readers and spectators.”8
The problem with “criticism conceived as magistrate”—the problem
that McDonald not only does not solve, but does not acknowledge—is
that there are no objective criteria of aesthetic distinction. The reason is
that there is nothing that all great works of literature have in common
but lesser works of literature do not. When critics propose criteria that
they think will distinguish the great from the non-great, they end up
narrowing the canon of great literature in arbitrary ways, as T. S. Eliot
attempted to do with Milton and Shelley. There is no need to develop
a litmus test for great literature. Critics can point to the features of
literary works that they like or dislike without assuming the authority
to tell people what they should read. And Croce was right: you don’t
need evaluative critics in order to have a “canon” of great literature.
The canon evolves in Darwinian fashion; writers compete, and the works
that are best adapted to the cultural environment flourish.
I fear that McDonald has succumbed to the cliché that the enemy of
my enemy is my friend: the cultural studies crowd is against evaluative
criticism, so McDonald is for it, provided it is objective—but he does
not show how literary criticism can be objective. But the problem is
not that modern-day literary criticism is not evaluative; it is that literary criticism aimed at increasing the readership of great literature has
been displaced by literary theory, on the one hand, and by literary
scholarship for literary scholars only (like Targoff’s book on Donne),
on the other hand.
A recent issue of the New Yorker contains a terrific article on Milton by
a journalist (who is also the author of a novel appropriately titled Eve’s
Apple). The New Yorker has a large circulation and the article will persuade
some of the magazine’s subscribers to read or re-read Milton’s poetry,
but not because Jonathan Rosen is an “authority.” The great writers
are little read in the United States, but this is not because they are not
agreed to be great writers. College teachers influenced by modern-day
literary theory to trash great literature and feed their captive audience a
diet of obscurantist theoretical writings and deservedly obscure literary
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works are doubtless a factor in the decline of the literary culture. But
the dearth of evaluative criticism is not. If there were less pretentious
literary theory and no evaluative criticism, but more readable literary
criticism in the style of Cleanth Brooks or F. R. Leavis, the literary culture would be in a lot better shape than it is.
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
and University of Chicago Law School
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